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Abstract
Despite a longstanding belief that education importantly affects the process of
immigrant assimilation, little is known about the relative importance of different
mechanisms linking these two processes. This paper explores this issue through
an examination of the effects of human capital on one dimension of assimilation,
immigrant intermarriage. I argue that there are three primary mechanisms through
which human capital affects the probability of intermarriage. First, human capital
may make immigrants better able to adapt to the native culture thereby making it
easier to share a household with a native. Second, it may raise the likelihood that
immigrants leave ethnic enclaves, thereby decreasing the opportunity to meet po-
tential spouses of the same ethnicity. Finally, assortative matching on education in
the marriage market suggests that immigrants may be willing to trade similarities
in ethnicity for similarities in education when evaluating potential spouses. Using
a simple spouse-search model, I first derive an identification strategy for differ-
entiating the cultural adaptability effect from the assortative matching effect, and
then I obtain empirical estimates of their relative importance while controlling for
the enclave effect. Using U.S. Census data, I find that assortative matching on
education is the most important avenue through which human capital affects the
probability of intermarriage. Further support for the model is provided by deriving
and testing some of its additional implications.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: J12, I21, J15
Keywords: Interethnic Marriage, Human Capital, Second-Generation Immi-
grants, Assimilation
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1 Introduction
The assimilation of immigrants has been an intensely debated topic both in academia and the media.
The speed, measured in both years and generations, at which immigrants become indistinguishable
from the native population has important implications for policies governing both the quantity
and types of immigrants allowed into the country. Understanding the process through which
assimilation occurs is also crucial for determining how best to aid their adjustment upon arrival.
Although there is a significant body of literature on the economic assimilation of immigrants,
surprisingly little research has been done on what could be both a major catalyst for and result
of the process: the social integration of immigrants.1 This paper examines social integration by
using interethnic marriage as its measure.
Many empirical papers have found positive relationships between intermarriage and other as-
pects of assimilation. Meng and Gregory (2005) find that even after controlling for standard
measures of human capital, intermarried immigrants in Australia have 15-23 percent higher earn-
ings than non-intermarried immigrants.2 They explain that this may be due to the critical role of
social networks in the job search process. Marrying a native certainly increases the proportion of
natives in one’s social circle, and since natives typically have lower unemployment rates and higher
wages, forming relationships with them may have a positive effect on immigrants’ labor market
outcomes.
Intermarriage plays an even greater role in the assimilation of the children of immigrants.
Children with intermarried parents complete more years of schooling than do children with two
immigrant parents (Chiswick and DebBurman 2004). Compared to children of two foreign-born
1Borjas (1995), Edin et al. (2003), and Munshi (2003) all find evidence of the importance of social contacts in the
economic assimilation of immigrants.
2Caution should be used in interepreting this result since Kantarevic (2004) finds that after accounting for the
positive selection into interethnic marriages, the intermarriage premium disappears.
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parents, the odds of dropping out of high school are 27 percent lower for children with a native-
born father and 22 percent lower for children with a native-born mother (Ramakrishnan 2004).
Correspondingly, those second-generation immigrants with a native-born parent have lower average
earnings than those with two immigrant parents (Ramakrishnan 2004). Children of intermarried
immigrants are also more likely to marry outside of their ethnic group (Cohen 1977), potentially
further reinforcing the positive effects of intermarriage on other dimensions of assimilation through
the generations.
Because schooling levels can be directly affected by public policy, it is particularly important
to understand how human capital affects the probability of intermarriage. Moreover, as suggested
by Duncan and Trejo (2005), if education is positively related to intermarriage and children of
intermarried parents are less likely to associate with any specific ethnicity, then estimates of in-
tergenerational assimilation as measured by education outcomes may be biased downward.3 This
paper examines the mechanisms through which education affects intermarriage decisions.
Previous empirical studies of the relationship between education and intermarriage have pro-
duced mixed results. A number of authors have found a positive relationship (e.g. Meng and
Gregory 2005, Lichter and Qian 2001, Cohen 1977). However, Hwang, Saenz, and Aguirre (1996)
find that Asian women with lower levels of education are more likely to outmarry racially. Kitano et
al. (1984) find no relationship between occupational status and outmarriage for Chinese, Japanese,
and Koreans in California. Based on another set of studies, Lieberson and Waters (1988) conclude
that the influence of education on ethnic endogamy, marriage within ethnicity, is relatively small.
In this paper, I develop a model that can reconcile all of these seemingly contradictory findings.
In line with the explanations for the scarcity of interracial marriages presented by Wong (2003),
I argue that the mechanisms through which human capital affects ethnic endogamy fall into three
3Duncan and Trejo (2005) find evidence of this for the case of Mexican Americans.
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main categories.4 First, education may improve immigrants’ abilities to adapt to the customs and
culture of the host country. For example, educated immigrants may be more fluent in the host
country’s language, and so they can share a household with a native more efficiently. I call this
explanation of the negative relationship between education and endogamy the cultural adaptability
effect.
Another way in which education may decrease the likelihood of endogamy is through its effect
on migration patterns. For example, by increasing the geographic scope of the labor market,
education may result in outmigration from ethnic enclaves. Leaving areas with high foreign-born
concentrations makes it more difficult to meet potential spouses of the same ethnicity and so, even
if preferences remain constant, the probability of intramarriage decreases. I call this the enclave
effect.
Lastly, it has been widely shown in both the theoretical and empirical marriage literature that
there is assortative matching on education in the marriage market. This implies that even if
people do not care at all for marrying within ethnicity, there could be high endogamy rates if the
distributions of education vary by ethnicity. In the more likely scenario that immigrants care
both about a spouse’s ethnicity and education level, because search is costly, they may be willing
to trade similarities in ethnicity for similarities in education. Regardless of whether immigrants
have preferences for marrying within their ethnicity, the assortative matching effect implies that
an increase in education should result in a decrease in endogamy for people in low education ethnic
groups but an increase in endogamy for people in high education ethnic groups.
In this paper, I first derive an identification strategy for differentiating the cultural adaptability
effect from the assortative matching effect. I then obtain empirical estimates of their relative
4Wong’s three explanations for the lack of interracial marriages are a mating taboo, scarcity of courting opportu-
nities, and differences in individual endowments between blacks and whites. By structurally estimating the impact
of these three explanations, she finds that eliminating the mating taboo would be the only successful way to increase
interracial marriages (Wong 2003).
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importance while controlling for the enclave effect. I find that assortative matching on education
is the most important avenue through which human capital affects the probability of intermarriage.
The empirical analysis is conducted solely on second-generation immigrants, the native born
children of immigrants. Their marriage decisions are studied because they are less likely to suffer
from language barriers and more likely to be exposed to the U.S. marriage market. Beyond
these practical concerns, second-generation immigrants are an interesting demographic group in
themselves since, although they are born and most likely raised in the U.S., they continue to
exhibit marked preferences toward spouses of their ethnicity.5
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I present a theoretical model of the
interethnic marriage decision which provides an identification strategy for disentangling the different
mechanisms through which human capital affects interethnic marriage decisions. A description of
the sample used, descriptive statistics, the empirical specification of the test implied by the model,
and empirical results are discussed in Section 3. In order to provide further support for the model,
I present and test two of its additional implications in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Theoretical Model of Spouse-Search
Many sociologists and a few economists have produced descriptive papers detailing the extent and
possible reasons for intermarriage, but very few have attempted to formally model immigrants’ de-
cisions of whom to marry.6 In this section, a theoretical framework of interethnic marriage decisions
is presented and then used to specifically analyze the effect of education on these decisions.
Starting with the pioneering work of Becker (1981), economists and sociologists have used
5Angrist (2002) exploits the high endogamy rates of second-generation immigrants to test for the importance of
sex ratios on various economic and demographic outcomes.
6The only exception that I am aware of is Bisin and Verdier (2000). Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004) structurally
estimate a model of interreligious, as opposed to interethnic, marriages. Wong (2003) structurally models interracial
marriages, but does not specifically study intermarriages among immigrants.
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economic theory to analyze who marries whom. By assuming efficiency in the marriage market,
Becker predicts positive assortative matching of spouses on any quantitative trait for which the
marginal productivity of the husband’s trait on household production depends positively on the
wife’s trait. He cites intelligence, education, health, fecundity, religion, and ethnic origin as
examples of traits for which this is likely to be the case. Lam (1988) extends Becker’s analysis to
allow for gains from marriage due to the joint consumption, as opposed to production, of household
public goods. The model presented below builds on these models but also incorporates the fact
that because of search frictions and uncertainties, optimal matches do not always occur.
Figure 1 provides a game tree representation of the spouse-search process. For simplicity, the
process is set up as a one-sided game in which the man proposes marriage to a woman if it is in his
best interest and the woman always accepts the marriage proposal.7 I assume that there are only
two relevant types of women: Ethnics (women of the man’s ethnicity) and Americans (women
of a different ethnicity). Each man lives for two periods. In the first period, the man randomly
meets an Ethnic with probability p and an American with probability 1 − p. One can think of
these probabilities as the proportion of the population within close geographic proximity that is of
his own ethnicity. The woman he meets has a level of education, hw, drawn from the distribution
Fe if she is Ethnic and Fa if she is American. Let hwe denote a draw of education from the Ethnic
distribution and hwa denote a draw of education from the American distribution. After observing
the ethnicity and level of education of the woman with whom he is matched in the first period,
the man decides whether to marry her or remain single until the second period. In the second
period, the game is repeated but then he must choose either to marry the woman he is matched
with or remain single for the remainder of his life. For simplicity, I will assume that everyone
prefers marriage to anyone above being a life-long bachelor. Thus, the only decision made in this
7Of course, the symmetric case where women make proposals and men always accept would imply symmetric






























Figure 1: A Model of Spouse-Search
game is whether or not to marry in the first period. The man will choose to marry in the first
period if his utility from the first period match is greater than his expected utility in the second
period. I assume that although he does not know exactly with whom he will be matched in the
second period, he does know the distributions of education in both populations and the probability
of getting a draw from each population.
There are two important components to husband i’s utility from marriage: his preferences for
marrying within his ethnicity and within a similar education level. Because returns from marriage
can result at least partially from the joint consumption of household public goods (Lam 1988),
it is optimal for couples to sort in the marriage market according to their similar demands for
these goods. Because so many goods jointly consumed in the household are related to ethnicity,
it is efficient for immigrants to marry someone of the same ethnicity. Language, cuisine, holiday
celebrations, and other family traditions are some examples of household public goods related to
ethnicity. There is evidence that interethnic marriages are more likely to end in divorce (Kalmijn
et al. 2005). These divorces could be a result of a failure to agree on important ethnicity-specific
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household public goods. Preferences for household public goods can also be related to people’s
education levels. For example, education is related to liberal sex-role attitudes (Davis 1982), a desire
for fewer children (Kohn 1977), preferences over how to spend leisure time together (Robinson
1977), and political views (Hyman and Wright 1977). Because children, joint vacations, and
political conversations can all be considered household public goods, it is also efficient for couples
to sort in the marriage market according to their demands for these public goods and, consequently,
to sort by education level. Using synthetic cohorts from the 1960 U.S. Census, Kalmijn (1993)
finds that educational homogamy among second-generation immigrants has increased while ethnic
endogamy has decreased.
Because people prefer to marry within both their ethnic and education groups, but spouse search
is costly, individuals may trade similarities in ethnicity for similarities in education. Preferences
for similarities in education are modeled using a simple quadratic loss function composed of the
difference between spousal education levels. The ethnicity of the spouse enters into the utility
function as an additively separable term, T (hi,Xi) where hi is the man’s level of education and Xi
is a vector of all characteristics other than education that determine a man’s taste for marrying
an Ethnic. This term is normalized to zero in the utility from marrying an American. Thus,
the utility of an Ethnic man i from marrying an Ethnic and an American respectively can be
written,
Uie = T (hi,Xi)− (hwe − hi)2 (1)
Uia = −(hwa − hi)2 (2)
For simplicity, let T (hi,Xi) = a(Xi)− bhi where b is a parameter measuring the effect of the man’s
education on his taste for marrying within ethnicity. If tastes for ethnicity are non-negative, then
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a(Xi) ≥ bhi. According to the cultural adaptability hypothesis, educated individuals are better
able to learn the customs associated with the native culture, and so they do not care as much for
ethnicity-specific household public goods. That is, immigrants with high levels of education may
not consider ethnicity such an important characteristic in a spouse. If the cultural adaptability
hypothesis is true, T (hi,Xi) depends negatively on education and thus b > 0. Characteristics in
the X vector could include, for example, personal ethnic identity, traditionality, religion, country
of origin, age at marriage, and age.
The only decision made in this game is whether or not to marry in the first period. The man
will marry in the first period if the utility he gets from marriage exceeds his expected utility in the
second period. Supresssing subscripts, his expected utility from waiting, i.e. his reservation utility,
can be written,
R = pE[Ue] + (1− p)E[Ua]− τ (3)
= p(T (hi,Xi)−E[(hwe − hi)2]) + (1− p)(−E[(hwa − hi)2])− τ
where τ > 0 reflects the utility cost of delaying marriage due to intertemporal preferences. Note
that the probability of being matched with someone of the same ethnicity remains the same in both
periods. To start, the variances in education for the two populations will be assumed equal, but
deviations from this assumption are discussed in Section 4.
The probability of marrying in the first period given that he is matched with a woman of his own
ethnicity is equal to the probability that the utility from that woman is greater than his reservation
utility. This is,
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Similarly, if he is matched with an American,
Pr(Ua > R) = Pr(−(hwa − hi)2 > R) (5)
= Pr(h−
√







−R) assuming hwa continuous
≡ Fa(Lua)− Fa(Lla)
Intuitively, Lue and L
l
e denote the upper and lower limits of acceptable levels of education for
Ethnics while Lua and L
l
a denote limits for Americans. Note that because people have a preference
for marrying within their ethnicity, T > 0, the range of education levels acceptable for Ethnics is
wider than the range acceptable for Americans.
If the game were altered so that spouse-searchers could choose to remain single after viewing
their second period match, the bands of acceptable matches in the first period would become
narrower, but this would not change any of the central implications of the model. Moreover, since
only around 5 percent of the population never marry in their lifetime, this is not a serious flaw to
the model (U.S. Census Bureau 2002).
There are three ways in which a man can end up married to a woman of his own ethnicity by
the end of the game. First, he can be randomly matched with an Ethnic (with probability p) in
the first period and choose to marry her. Second, he can first be matched with an Ethnic, choose
not to marry her, but be randomly matched with another Ethnic in the second period. Third,
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he can be matched with an American in the first period, decide not to marry her and be matched
with a woman of his own ethnicity in the second period. Thus, the probability of endogamy can
be written with three components8:
Pr(Endogamy) = pPr(Ue > R) + p(1− Pr(Ue > R))p+ (6)
(1− p) Pr(1− Pr(Ua > R))p
Inserting equations (4) and (5) into (6) and then rearranging terms, a more intuitive expression
can be written,
Pr(Endogamy) = p+ p(1− p){[Fe(Lue )− Fe(Lle)]− [Fa(Lua)− Fa(Lla)]} (7)
The first term in equation (7) represents the random matching component of the spouse search
process while the second term represents the component arising from preferences. Naturally,
the higher the probability of encountering an Ethnic, the higher the probability of marrying one.
Moreover, if p = 0, the probability of endogamy is zero while if p = 1 the probability of endogamy
is one. Figure 2 helps to understand the preference aspect of the model. The diagram depicts
probability density functions for education levels of Ethnics and Americans. In this example,
Ethnics are assumed to have lower levels of education than Americans. Recall that all Ethnics
with education levels between Lue and L
l
e will be accepted while only Americans with education
levels between Lua and L
l
a will be accepted. Thus, the difference between the area under the Ethnic
distribution between Lue and L
l





8The model can fairly easily be extended to a two-sided framework by incorporating a potential spouse’s ability
to reject a marriage proposal in the first period. Intuitively, the biggest change to the model is that it becomes more
likely that people will be randomly matched in the second period (a smaller weight is given in the final expression to
preferences). The qualitative implications of the model do not change.
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represents the component of endogamy arising from preferences, unweighted by p(1− p). In this
example, because education of the man is very low and Ethnics have lower levels of education, the
endogamy rate is greater than what is implied by random matching. The area under the Ethnic
distribution between the outer acceptance limits and the inner acceptance limits represents tastes
for ethnicity unrelated to people’s preferences for similarities in education levels.
2.1 Cultural Adaptability
According to the cultural adaptability effect, an increase in education decreases a person’s tastes
for marrying within ethnicity because he or she can more easily assimilate to the host country.
This implies that regardless of a person’s ethnicity, an increase in education leads to a decrease in
endogamy.
Proposition 1 According to teh cultural adaptability hypothesis, the effect of an increase in edu-
cation on endogamy is never positive.
Proof: In order to look at the effect of education on endogamy solely through tastes, we need
only take the derivative of equation (7) with respect to T and then take the derivative of T with






p(1− p)2(T −R)−12 [fe(Lue ) + fe(Lle)] +
1
2
p2(1− p)(−R)− 12 [fa(Lua) + fe(Lla)]
> 0
Since ∂T∂h = −b and, if the cultural adaptability hypothesis is true, b > 0, by the chain rule, the effect
of education through cultural adaptability is always negative regardless of h, p, or even whether one
belongs to a high education ethnicity or a low education ethnicity.
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Figure 2: Cultural Adaptability Effect of Education
As education increases, T approaches zero since, by assumption, zero is the minimum value of
T . As T approaches zero, the acceptable values of education for Ethnics move closer and closer
to the limits for Americans as depicted by the arrows in Figure 2. Thus, the shaded region in the
figure necessarily decreases regardless of the distributions of education in the two populations and
the man’s level of education. This finding lets us identify the cultural adaptability effect in the
data.
2.2 Assortative Matching
In order to clearly differentiate the assortative matching effect from the cultural adaptability effect,
I will assume that immigrants have no taste for marrying within ethnicity, T = 0, and care only
about marrying someone with a similar level of education. This assumption has two consequences.
First, as can be seen from equation (3), the reservation utility increases by the size of the tastes
weighted by the probability of being matched with an Ethnic, pT . More importantly, however,
when T = 0, the range of acceptable levels of education in the first period is the same for Ethnics






a. I let L
u denote the common upper limit of the acceptance
region and Ll denote the common lower limit. The probability of marrying within ethnicity can
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Figure 3: Probabilty of Endogamy when T=0
then be written
Pr(Endogamy) = p+ p(1− p){[Fe(Lu)− Fe(Ll)]− [Fa(Lu)− Fa(Ll)]} (8)
Figure 3 depicts the preference portion of the probability of marrying within ethnicity for a
person with a low level of education. The shaded region shows the probability of marrying within
ethnicity above that which is implied by random matching. Notice that even with no preference
for marrying within ethnicity, assortative matching on education can yield high endogamy rates if
education distributions differ by ethnicity. As education increases, however, the acceptable limits
shift rightward as shown by the arrows in Figure 4 to levels of education that are more frequent
among Americans than Ethnics. Of course, when Americans typically have less education than
Ethnics, the acceptance limits shift toward education levels that are more frequent among Ethnics.























The first component of equation (9) represents the change in endogamy due to the shift of the




−R represents the amount by which the right hand side of the acceptance region
shifts with an increase in the man’s education while 1 + dR/dh
2
√
−R represents the shift in the left hand
side of the acceptance region. Because of the quadratic loss resulting from differences in education
levels between spouses, an increase in education of the man shifts the acceptance region (both the
left and right hand side limits) to the right.
Proposition 2 An increase in the man’s education results in a shift to the right of the accepted











Proof: See Appendix A.
The effect of an increase in education on endogamy is illustrated in Figure 4. The darker shaded
region represents the increase in endogamy resulting from the rightward shift of the right-hand limit
while the lightly shaded region represents the decrease in endogamy resulting from the rightward
shift of the left-hand limit. For the example depicted in the diagram, since the darker shaded
region is smaller than the lightly shaded region, the increase in education will result in a decrease
in endogamy. If the labels on the two distributions were reversed, as would be the case for an
immigrant in a high education ethnicity, then an increase in education would result in an increase
in endogamy. Thus, a very intuitive implication arises from the assortative matching theory: an
increase in education will lead to a decrease in endogamy for people in low education ethnicities
and an increase for people in high education ethnicities. In actuality, however, the model requires
a few additional conditions in order to predict this result.
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Figure 4: Assortative Matching Effect of Education on Endogamy
Proposition 3 Assuming fe and fa are two continuous and identical distributions with different









e ) such that
if either p > 1/2 and h > h∗, p < 1/2 and h < h∗, or if p = 1/2, an increase in h will yield a
decrease in the probability of marrying within ethnicity.
dPr(Endogamy)
dh









a , the opposite is true. That is, if either p < 1/2 and h > h
∗, p > 1/2 and h < h∗,









Proof: See Appendix B.
For expositional purposes, I will defer a discussion of these conditions until Section 4. For now,
it is enough to point that these conditions hold in general.
To summarize the implications of the model presented thus far, an increase in education always
leads to a decrease in the probability of marrying within ethnicity through the cultural adaptability
effect, but has differential implications through the assortative matching effect. The enclave effect
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is not directly modeled in that p is not written as a function of h. However, the enclave effect is
accounted for in the empirical section of this paper when differentiating the cultural adaptability
from the assortative matching effect.
3 The Data
3.1 Sample
This study uses the 1970 Form 2 PUMS metro sample in conjunction with the 1970 Fourth Count
Population Summary Tape Files, SF 4. I study specifically the marriage decisions of second-
generation immigrants because they are less likely to suffer from language barriers, and their ex-
posure to U.S. marriage markets is clearer. Also, since a principle way immigrants can become
U.S. citizens is through marriage to a native, marriage choices may depend a great deal on the
type of visa immigrants hold (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990, Jasso et al. 2000). By examining
just the decisions of second-generation immigrants, who are by birth citizens of the U.S., motives
behind interethnic marriages are clearer. This specific sample is used because Form 2 in census
year 1970 was the last time census respondents were asked for their parents’ country of birth.9 I
will only consider marriage decisions of native-born children with two foreign-born parents. Since
the PUMS only reports the father’s country of birth if both parents are foreign born, the ethnicity
of second-generation immigrants is determined by the father’s birthplace. Since, according to
the 2000 Current Population Survey, 98.5 percent of all children with two immigrant parents are
children of immigrant parents from the same country, I do not think this limitation influences the
central results.
Because the 1970 PUMS is only a one percent sample of the U.S. population, it is very difficult
9Since 1970, a question on ancestry has been asked, but there is no way to know how many generations families
have been in the U.S. It is also unclear what causes people to differentially associate with various ethnic backgrounds.
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to obtain accurate measures of the size of the ethnic group within close geographic proximity. The
SF 4 contains 15 percent sample data inflated to represent the total U.S. population. Population
items used in this analysis are counts of the foreign born and native born (of foreign or mixed
parentage) constructed for each ethnicity at various geographic summarization levels. I am able to
match the PUMS with the Summary Files by country, state, and county group subarea.10 County
groups are made up of an urban center and surrounding counties where economic activity is focused
at the center. Since the central urban area is considered to be the labor market center, it is not
unreasonable to believe that it is also the marriage market center. Many large county groups
are divided into two or more subareas. These identify metropolitan areas or county components
of metropolitan areas with more than 250,000 residents. In my sample, there are approximately
280 county group subareas. There are over 2 million individual observations in the PUMS and
over 400 thousand married couples where the spouse is present in the household. The analysis
presented in this paper is performed on the 39,943 married second-generation male immigrants
within ethnicities with over 1000 observations in the sample. I have completed the same analysis
on second-generation females and results are qualitatively the same.
3.2 Variables
A second-generation male is considered to be ethnically intramarried in this analysis if his wife
has at least one parent born in the country of birth of his father. Note that by this definition,
a second-generation male will be considered ethnically intramarried if he marries an immigrant, a
woman whose parents were both born abroad, or a woman with one parent born abroad, as long as
the couple shares a common ethnicity. In more technical terms, y, the endogamy dummy, is equal
10The finest geographic partition within the PUMS metro sample is the county group. The SF 4 files do not
contain population counts for county groups, but do contain them for counties. I simply sum county counts within
county group to get the county group information.
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to one if the ethnicity of the husband is the same as the ethnicity of his wife and zero otherwise.
In the PUMS, education is measured in levels. In order for the regression coefficients to be
more easily interpreted, I construct the years of schooling variable by mapping these levels into the
average number of years it takes for people to complete them according to Chiswick and DebBurman
(2004). A dummy variable for whether or not English is a person’s native language, is used as a
proxy for ethnic identity which is in the X vector in the model. Parents choose the mother tongue
of their children. Children of parents with strong ethnic attachments are more likely to have a
non-English mother tongue and identify with their parents’ country of birth (Stevens 1987). The
Non-English Native Tongue variable takes on the value one if English is not the native tongue
and zero if it is. Age is another variable in the X vector. Since children have gained more
independence from parents as society has modernized in the past century (Kalmijn 1991), parental
preference for the intramarriage of their children may be less of a salient factor in ethnic preferences
of younger second-generation immigrants. The variable, Ethnic Group Size, is used as a proxy for
the probability of meeting someone of the same ethnicity, p. It is constructed using the summary
data file by dividing the number of people of that ethnicity (immigrant or native born with at least
one parent born abroad) by the number of people in the population. When regressions are run for
smaller geographic partitions than the entire country, average levels of education are also specific to
the person’s residence. For example, average education in ethnicity in the person’s county group
is used for the county group level regressions.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the distribution of types of spouses for second-generation male immigrants between
the ages of 16 and 65. Note that even though Americans (3rd generation or above immigrants)
make up around 85 percent of the population, only about half of second-generation men marry
19
Marriage Type Number Percentage
Immigrant, Same Ethnicity 1252 3.3
2nd Generation, Same Ethnicity 8188 21.6
American 19949 52.7
Immigrant, Differerent Ethnicity 2013 5.3
2nd Generation, Different Ethnicity 6250 16.5
Immigrant, Parents Same Ethnicity 189 0.5
Total 37841 100
Table 1: Frequencies of Marriage Types for Second-Generation Males
Americans. In fact, one in every four second-generation men marry within their ethnicity. Since
second-generation immigrants as a group make up only around 3 percent of the entire population,
the fact that 21 percent of second-generation immigrants marry second-generation women of their
own ethnicity is something to be noticed.
The prevalence of endogamous marriages becomes even more apparent when comparing actual
rates of endogamy with endogamy rates implied by random matching for each ethnicity. As seen
in Table 2, for example, since Italians constitute 2.09 percent of the population of the U.S., random
matching within the U.S. would imply an endogamy rate of 2.09 percent. The actual endogamy
rate of 43 percent is over 20 times this amount. As discussed previously, it may not be reasonable to
compare endogamy rates to the rates implied by random matching within the entire country since
marriage markets do not extend to the entire country. Since immigrants and their children tend to
live in or near ethnic enclaves, it makes more sense to look at the ethnic population proportions
within states and county groups. The average Italian lives in a county group in which Italians
make up 5 percent of the population. This still is not even close to the endogamy rate of 43
percent. Even in the county group with the largest proportion of foreign stock of any particular
ethnicity, Mexicans make up 40 percent of the population in that county group. As expected,
the random matching rate of 40 percent within the county group is closer to the actual endogamy
rate of 53 but it remains lower. Table 2 also presents ethnicity specific statistics on education
levels. Notice that there are significant differences in average number of years of education among
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Canada 17.24 1.49 4.55 11.04 3.06
Mexico 53.61 1.15 6.42 8.35 3.98
Sweden 10.05 0.40 0.95 11.51 2.73
Ireland 13.53 0.71 1.58 11.91 2.79
Italy 42.92 2.09 5.10 10.43 2.85
Austria 12.65 0.48 0.81 11.03 3.04
Czechoslovakia 17.54 0.37 0.85 10.53 2.80
Germany 10.41 1.78 2.39 11.02 3.03
Hungary 11.58 0.30 0.56 10.94 2.87
Poland 31.75 1.17 2.44 10.56 3.05
Yugoslavia 19.98 0.22 0.53 10.87 2.77
Lithuania 20.02 0.16 0.33 11.07 3.03
Russia 34.75 0.96 2.22 12.29 3.10
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Ethnicity
1970 Census, 
SF 4 1970 PUMS















0-4 15 0.24 0.72 0.44 0.67
4-6 193 0.30 0.65 0.16 0.34
6-8 252 0.13 0.63 0.08 0.18
8-10 764 0.25 0.50 0.04 0.10
10-12 228 0.05 0.36 0.03 0.08
12-14 266 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.05
14-16 205 0.01 0.26 0.02 0.05
Russians p=.024 0.078
0-4 25 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.08
4-6 390 0.14 0.35 0.03 0.08
6-8 407 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.05
8-10 1312 0.47 0.42 0.02 0.08
10-12 493 0.12 0.38 0.02 0.08
12-14 661 0.09 0.38 0.03 0.08
14-16 760 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.15
Implied Endogamy Rates 
Table 3: Evidence of Preferences for Ethnicity
years for Russians. Standard deviations are around three for all ethnicities.
Because of the substantial amount of dispersion in education levels across ethnicities, assortative
matching on education implies that the distributions of education must be considered in order to
get a sense for tastes for endogamy. For example, if there are only two ethnicities in a location
and members of one ethnicity typically have lower levels of education than the other, then even if
there are no preferences for ethnicity, there will be high endogamy rates simply due to assortative
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matching on education. In Table 3, implied endogamy rates for Mexicans, the least educated
ethnicity, and Russians, the most educated, are constructed by assuming that people randomly
match within education group in close geographic proximity. Due to the limited sample size, I
assume that within ethnicity, education distributions do not differ by geography. Since I know the
education distributions for Mexicans and Russians as well as Americans, I can calculate implied
endogamy rates for different measures of the relevant size of the ethnic group with a straightforward
application of Bayes rule.11 As expected, the actual endogamy rates presented in column 4 of Table
3 tend to decrease as education increases for Mexicans and increase slightly for Russians. Implied
endogamy rates shown in columns 5-6 mirror these patterns for two different estimates of the
relevant size of the ethnic group.
In column 5, implied endogamy rates are calculated using the mean proportion of Mexicans
living in each county group. Column 6 reports implied endogamy rates using Borjas’ estimate
of the mean proportion of Mexicans living in the neighborhoods of second-generation Mexicans
(Borjas 1995).12 For all but the lowest educated group, actual endogamy rates range from being
double to ten times as high as implied endogamy rates.
Russians are more educated and less segregated than Mexicans. Implied endogamy rates are
highest for Russians with more than 16 years of schooling. Even when using the largest estimate
of the relevant size of ethnicity, 7.8 percent, actual endogamy rates are 2 to 4 times as high as
implied endogamy rates. To conclude, although assortative matching on education within close
11To be more specific, the implied endogamy rate is actually the probability of matching with an ethnic given that
one must match with someone in the same education group. Thus,
Pr(Match = e|H = h) = Pr(H = h|Match = e)Pr(Match = e)
Pr(H = h)
where Pr(H = h) = Pr(H = h|Match = e)Pr(Match = e)+Pr(H = h|Match = a)Pr(Match = a). The probability
that the person is matched with someone of the same ethnicity is p while the probability that the person is matched
with someone of a different ethnicity is 1− p.
12Borjas admits that his estimates should be interpreted with caution since the mean number of observations in a
neighborhood is 26 and the interquartile range is 9.
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Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard 
Error Error Error
Husband
Age 49.36 9.89 51.30 8.92 49.90 9.67
Schooling 11.46 3.30 10.38 3.47 11.16 3.38
Non-English 0.76 0.43 0.88 0.32 0.79 0.41
Wife 
Age 45.75 10.14 48.55 9.17 46.53 9.96
Schooling 11.46 2.53 10.16 2.99 11.10 2.73
Non-English 0.34 0.47 0.84 0.37 0.48 0.50
Exogamous Couples Endogamous Couples All 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Second-Generation Males and their Wives by Marriage Type
geographic proximity explains a significant portion of endogamy rates, a considerable amount can
only be attributed to preferences for marrying within ethnicity.
The cultural adaptability effect implies that tastes for ethnicity decrease as education increases.
In terms of Table 3, this suggests that the difference between actual endogamy rates and implied
endogamy rates should be decreasing as education increases for both ethnicities. In actuality, how-
ever, the difference is slightly increasing in education, but the effect is not statistically significant.
In Table 4, means and standard deviations of second-generation males are shown for various
characteristics by whom they marry. Men who marry within their ethnicity have on average one
year less of education than their intermarrying counterparts. Their wives follow this pattern almost
exactly. For all of the different ethnicities and the population as a whole, education of the husband
is positively correlated with education of the wife. Also note that, as implied by the model, the
difference in average years of schooling between husband and wife is greater in exogamous couples
than in endogamous couples. Men who marry within their ethnicity are slightly older than those
who marry out. This suggests a downward trend in ethnic endogamy through time. Wives’ ages
follow the same pattern. Approximately eighty percent of all second-generation males do not have
English as their native language. Not surprisingly, men with a non-English native tongue are more
likely to marry within their ethnicity.
Figure 5 graphs endogamy rates by ethnicity and level of education. Ethnicities are ordered on
the x axis by average years of schooling. The darker bars show endogamy rates for people with
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Endogamy Rates by Ethnicity and Education
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Figure 5: Evidence of Assortative Matching on Education
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education levels above the median for that ethnicity while the lighter bars show endogamy rates for
people with education levels below the median. The black line in the middle marks the average level
of education in the U.S. as a whole, 11.30. Superimposed on the bar chart is a fitted polynomial
through the low education endogamy rates. As predicted by the assortative matching model, the
curve has a U shape. That is, the highest endogamy rates are for ethnicities with average education
levels furthest away from the average education in the U.S. population. Moreover, for ethnicities
with average education levels less than the U.S. average, within ethnicity, highly educated people
typically have lower endogamy rates than lowly educated people. The opposite is generally true
for ethnicities with average education levels above the U.S. average. This suggests that assortative
matching on education does in fact play an important role in explaining endogamy rates. However,
for a more complete test, we turn to regression analysis.
3.4 Empirical Specification and Results
To disentangle the cultural adaptability effect from the assortative matching effect of education on
endogamy, I test for the differential impact of education depending on the average education in
one’s ethnic group. The following probit model is estimated:












In this model, yijk is a dichotomous indicator equal to one if man i in ethnicity j in geographical
area k is married within his ethnicity and zero otherwise. In the empirical analysis, years of
schooling is used to proxy for h, mean group schooling13 for h
w
e and mean schooling for h
w
a . The
13Observations with averages constructed from fewer than 50 observations were dropped from the analysis.
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Endogamy 1 2 3
Schooling -0.019 -0.012 0.000
(-2.61)** (-1.69)+ (0.04)
Size of Ethnic Group 4.506 4.162
(5.65)** (5.07)**
Size of Ethnic Group2 -8.550 -8.355
(-4.58)** (-4.11)**
Schooling X 0.008
   (Mean Group Schooling-Mean Schooling) (2.11)*
(Mean Group Schooling-Mean Schooling) -0.110
(-5.05)**
Age 0.006 0.008 0.009
(2.22)* (3.37)** (5.56)**
Non-English Native Tongue 0.163 0.146 0.135
(5.70)** (4.54)** (5.39)**
Observations 20109 20109 20109
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5: Probit Marginal Effects of Schooling on Endogamy
share of the population belonging to i0s ethnicity, p, is captured by ethnic group size. The vector of
characteristics which capture tastes for marrying within ethnicity, X, includes age and non-English
native tongue. Tables 5 and 6 report coefficient estimates of variants of equation (10) estimated as
probit models. All errors are clustered on ethnicity.
The theoretical model implies that the effect of education through cultural adaptability is
always negative while its effect through assortative matching depends on ethnicity. That is,
assortative matching implies that an increase in education will lead to a decrease in the probability
of marrying within ethnicity for people belonging to low education ethnicities while the opposite is
true for those belonging to high education groups. In particular, the larger the difference between
average education in the ethnic group and the rest of the population, the stronger will be the
assortative matching effect. Thus, we expect β1 < 0 if the cultural adaptability effect is true and
β2 > 0 if the assortative matching effect is true.
14 By including the proportion of the population
14Endogeneity may be of some concern in this analysis. For example, bachelors who care more about ethnicity
may invest less in their own human capital. This, however, works against me in that it increases the probability
of finding a significant cultural adaptability effect when in fact, cultural adaptability does not play a strong role in
the marriage market. A potentially more problematic concern is if immigrants with high preferences for ethnicity
in high education ethnicities obtain more education in order to facilitate finding a same-ethnicity spouse while those
in low education ethnicities obtain less education for marriage market purposes. This story, however, only further
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Endogamy Country State County Group
Schooling 0.001 0.005 0.000
(0.1) (0.89) (0.04)
Size of Ethnic Group 30.724 9.12 4.162
(2.03)* (4.23)** (5.07)**
Size of Ethnic Group2 -883.444 -56.891 -8.355
(-1.53) (-2.58)** (-4.11)**
Schooling X 0.009 0.009 0.008
   (Mean Group Schooling-Mean Schooling) (1.90)+ (2.23)* (2.11)*
(Mean Group Schooling-Mean Schooling) -0.155 -0.125 -0.11
(-3.83)** (-4.54)** (-5.05)**
Age 0.007 0.009 0.009
(6.39)** (5.76)** (5.56)**
Non-English Native Tongue 0.103 0.114 0.135
(4.56)** (5.50)** (5.39)**
Observations 39943 29041 20109
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 6: Probit Marginal Effects of Schooling on Endogamy for Different Geographic Partitions
in his ethnicity living in this geographical area, any effect of education will be purged of the enclave
effect. Although the formal proof is not included in this paper, the size of the ethnic group increases
endogamy, but at a decreasing rate. This implies that β4 > 0 and β5 < 0.
According to the enclave effect, as education increases, people tend to move out of ethnic
enclaves and so have a lower probability of meeting potential spouses of the same ethnicity. The
PUMs does not contain information about whether people grew up in ethnic enclaves and, if so,
when they moved out. Thus, it is not possible to measure the enclave effect directly. However,
if I assume that after acquiring education, people move to where they are living at the time of the
survey, search for a spouse, marry, and remain in roughly the same location, the size of the ethnic
group variable would completely purge β1 and β2 of the enclave effect of education. Admittedly,
these conditions are quite strong, but biases resulting if these assumptions do not hold are not
large. They will be discussed shortly.
Table 5 compares marginal effects from different specifications of a probit model conducted at
the county group level. Notice that when education and controls for preferences for marrying within
enforces the importance of assortative matching in marriage markets.
27
ethnicity (Age and non-English native tongue) are the only variables included on the right hand side
of the regression, education has a negative and significant impact on the probability of in-marriage.
Regression results suggest that one more year of education leads to a .02 decrease in the probability
of marrying within ethnicity. According to the model, the effect of education could be small either
because there is simply little effect of education on the probability of interethnic marriage or because
the different avenues through which education affects intermarriage (i.e. cultural adaptability effect,
assortative matching on education effect, and enclave effect) have opposing effects that cancel each
other out. Controls for endogamy preference have the expected signs. That is, second-generation
immigrants with a non-English mother tongue are significantly more likely to marry within their
ethnicity, and older people are more likely to marry within ethnicity.
When controlling for ethnic group size in specification (2), the effect of education alone (cultural
adaptability effect) decreases by almost 50 percent and is only significant at the 10 percent level.
As expected, the larger the ethnic representation in the county group in which a second-generation
immigrant lives, the more likely he is to marry within his ethnicity. The negative coefficient on
the square of ethnic group size suggests that the slope is decreasing in group size as predicted by
the model.
The interaction term is added in specification (3) to differentiate the assortative matching effect
from the cultural adaptability effect. According to the assortative matching theory, an increase
in education has different effects depending on the ethnicity to which a person belongs. In fact,
as seen in Table 5, leaving constant the portion of the effect of education that changes depending
upon the ethnicity of the person, the effect of education alone is not statistically different from
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zero. Thus, there is no support for the cultural adaptability effect of education.15 ,16
Specific examples are useful for interpreting the magnitude of the assortative matching effect
of education. The effect of an increase in education has the greatest impact on second-generation
immigrants from countries whose mean education values are very different from the rest of the
population. For example, a Mexican second-generation male with an eighth grade education,
the average education for Mexicans, will decrease his probability of marrying a Mexican by 2.36
percentage points, 0+.008(8.35-11.30) by acquiring one additional year of education. (Mexicans
have an average of 8.35 years of education while Americans have an average of 11.30.) This suggests
that his decision to finish high school leads to an 8.4 percentage point increase in the probability
of intermarriage. On the other hand, for an average Russian second-generation immigrant, an
additional year of education increases his probability of intramarriage by 0.79 percentage points,
0+.008(12.29-11.30). Finishing college leads to a 2.94 percentage point increase in the probability
of marrying another Russian.
As suggested above, some caution must be used in the interpretation of these results because two
problems result from the poor measure of the opportunity of meeting others of the same ethnicity.
First, the size of the ethnic group within an immigrant’s close geographic proximity is endogenous
in that people choose where to live, potentially for reasons related to the marriage market. If with
more education, immigrants become more accepting of differences and thus more likely to both
15 It is unclear, however, whether parents’ country of birth is the most appropriate measure of ethnicity. There are
many countries with very different cultures within them, and these countries are more likely to have lower endogamy
rates all else equal. For example, a Russian Jew may have more in common ethnically with a Polish Jew than a
non-Jewish Russian. If this heterogeneity within countries is correlated with education, the coefficients on education
may be biased. As a test of whether the coefficients are biased, I included a measure of religious pluralism (obtained
from Barro and McCleary 2003) in the empirical specification. As expected, the coefficient on religous pluralism had
a negative sign but the coefficients on the education variables remain almost exactly the same.
16There may be some concerns about endogeneity in this empirical analysis. For example, bachelors who care
more about ethnicity of their spouses may invest less in their own human capital. This would bias the cultural
adaptability coefficient downward. However, because the assortative matching effect has little empirical support
anyway, this potential bias only accentuates my results. A potentially more problematic concern is if immigrants
who want to marry co-ethnics acquire more education if they are in high education ethnicities and less education if
they are in low education ethnicities. However, immigrants will only adopt this strategy if assortative matching on
education is an important element of the marriage market. Thus, my central result remains.
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move away from ethnic enclaves and marry an American, the cultural adaptability coefficient may
be biased towards zero. In this scenario, just as predicted by the cultural adaptabililty hypothesis,
education decreases preferences for ethnicity, but it may only affect marriage patterns through
people’s decisions about where to live and thus would not be captured in this analysis. The
empirical literature suggests that education always has a nonnegative effect on outmigration, and
so it is unlikely that the coefficient capturing the assortative matching effect is biased. For that
coefficient to be biased, the effect of education on outmigration should depend on the ethnic group
to which immigrants belong. Thus, we can interpret the cultural adaptability coefficient either
as an upperbound of the true effect of education on preferences for ethnicity or as the cultural
adabtability effect purged of its effect through location decisions.
Beyond these problems is the issue that the size of the ethnic group in this analysis is measured
at the time and place of the survey as opposed to the time and place when and where married
immigrants were searching for a spouse. It is conceivable that even immigrants who marry Ameri-
cans for reasons unrelated to education or preferences for ethnicity are more likely to leave enclaves
because their spouses are not bound to the enclave. Alternatively, immigrants may have been
predominantly exposed to Ethnics when they were searching for a spouse but because of their edu-
cation, they may have both married an American (by either the cultural adaptability or assortative
matching effect) and moved away from their enclave post-marriage.
The signs of the bias differ depending on which story is told, but a few empirical techniques
suggest that the bias is not large. First, the empirical analysis is run solely on those couples where
the husband is living in the same county that he was living in five years previous to the survey
date but the wife moved counties within the five years before the survey date. The presumption is
that these couples married within that five year period and that the husband is facing roughly the
same opportunity for endogamous marriage as he was while searching for a spouse. Estimating
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equation (10) on this limited sample, I find that the coefficients on the education variables remain
roughly the same in terms of size and significance, suggesting that although there may be a bias,
it is not very large. I also ran the empirical analysis on the entire sample using the size of the
ethnic group (at the time of the survey) in the man’s state of birth, and again, the results do not
change qualitatively. This technique does not control for the enclave effect in that it does not
capture people’s migration decisions as a result of an increase in education. However, if people
are more likely to search for a spouse in their state of birth, necessarily pre-marriage, than in their
state of residence at the time of the survey, then this measure of opportunity will be the more
appropriate one. Moreover, the fact that the coefficients on education do not change suggests that
my imperfect control for the enclave effect is not significantly biasing the results.17
It is not necessarily the case that the county group is the most relevant marriage market. Table
6 shows that for three different geographic partitions, assortative matching is the most important
avenue through which education affects endogamy. I have also conducted the analysis above on
marriage decisions of women and results are qualitatively the same.
4 Testing the Validity of the Model
The previous section presented a spouse-search model which provided a way to differentiate the
mechanisms through which human capital can affect marriage decisions. The validity of this
identification strategy, however, rests on the soundness of the model from which it was derived. In
this section, I provide support for the model by deriving some of its additional implications and
testing them with data.
17Regression coefficient tables for both of these empirical tests are available from the author upon request.
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Figure 6: Change in the Probability of Intramarriage when p is High and h is Low
4.1 Extremely High or Low Values of Spouse-Searcher Education
4.1.1 Theory
Although it is very intuitive that an increase in education yields an increase in endogamy for
people in high education ethnicities and a decrease for people in low education ethnicities, the
model presented in Section 2 does not always predict this relationship. As formally described in
Appendix B, even if variances in education are equal in the two populations, whether or not this
relationship holds depends on two factors: the spouse-searcher’s education, h, and the probability,
p, that he is matched with someone of his ethnicity. Specifically, an increase in education can
result in an increase in endogamy even for people in low education ethnicities if p is high enough
and h is low enough or if p is low enough and h is high enough. Similarly, an increase in education
can result in a decrease in endogamy for those in high education ethnicities if p and h are either
both low enough or both high enough. For simplicity of exposition, I will continue under the
assumptions that ethnicity of a spouse does not enter immigrants’ utility functions, that is T = 0,
and that variances of the education distributions of Ethnics and Americans are equal.
For pedagogical purposes, I will start with the case where p is neither high nor low but exactly
1/2 : Ethnics are just as likely to come across other Ethnics as they are Americans. This suggests
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Figure 7: Change in the Probability of Intramarriage when p is Low and h is High
that the level of education corresponding with expected utility in the second period is fairly close
to the education level corresponding with the intersection of the Ethnic and American education
distributions. Moreover, it implies that the acceptance region limits always lie on opposite sides
of the intersection (A formal proof is provided in Appendix B). Thus, even if a person in a low
education ethnicity has a very low level of education, the rightward shift of his upper limit will
always result in an increase in the probability of marrying an American. Similarly, if his education
is very high, the rightward shift of the lower limit always results in a decrease in the probability of
marrying an Ethnic.
Symmetric results follow when Ethnics typically have more education than Americans. The
rightward shift of the left hand limit will result in a decrease in the probability of marrying an
American even if the man’s education level is very high. The rightward shift of the right hand
limit will result in an increase in the probability of marrying an Ethnic if the man’s education level
is very low. To conclude, if p = 1/2, an increase in h will always lead to a decrease in endogamy
for people in low education ethnicities and an increase in endogamy for people in high education
ethnicities. This will not always be the case if p 6= 1/2.
Figures 6 and 7 are graphical representations of what can happen when h increases if p 6= 1/2.
Consider a spouse-searcher with a very low level of education in a low education ethnicity living
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in an area where he is considerably more likely to meet an Ethnic than an American. Figure 6
illustrates acceptance regions for the case where p is high and h is low. LL depicts the original
acceptance region and L0L0 shows how the region shifts with an increase in education. Notice that
for both levels of education, the acceptance regions lie over education levels that Ethnics are more
likely to have than Americans.18 As seen in Figure 6, this means that an increase in education
could actually result in an increase in the probability of marrying an Ethnic. The reason is that
the increase in the probability of marrying an Ethnic due to the rightward shift of the right hand
limit of the acceptance region, the darker shaded area in Figure 6, is greater than the decrease in
the probability resulting from the rightward shift of the left hand limit, the lightly shaded area.
More intuitively, because of the increase in the number of Ethnic marriages in the first period, fewer
people are randomly matched with an American in the second period and thus the probability of
ending up with someone of the same ethnicity actually increases.19
Using a similar logic, again under the assumption that Ethnics typically have less education
than Americans, an increase in the probability of marrying an Ethnic could result for a very well
educated man in a low education ethnicity if the probability of being matched with an Ethnic is
very low. Figure 7 depicts the same density functions as Figure 6, but acceptance regions are
shown for the case where p is low and h is high. This means that the Ethnic spouse-searcher has
a level of education that more closely resembles the American average education than the Ethnic
average and that he lives in an area with few fellow Ethnics. In this scenario, the entire acceptance
18The condition that he is very low educated in a low education ethnicity implies that he is not likely to accept
an American in the first period because Americans typically have much higher education levels than he does. The
condition that probability of meeting someone of his own ethnicity is very high implies that the level of education
corresponding with the expected utility in the second period is fairly close to the mean of the Ethnic distribution. This
implies that the right-hand limit of the acceptance region lies to the left of the intersection of the two distributions.
19 If spouse-searchers can choose to remain single if they end up with a particularly bad match, then this reversal
in sign will not be as pronounced. The initial increase in endogamy in this scenario occurs because spouse-searchers
become more likely to find acceptable matches in the first period. If the size of the ethnic group is large and education
is low, these first period matches are most likely Ethnic. Thus, spouse-searchers become less likely to be randomly
paired with an American who is most likely a bad match. If spouse-searchers can choose to remain single, then the












h low h high h low h high
p > 12 ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
p = 12 ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
p < 12 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Table 7: Effect of an Increase in Education by Education Level and Size of Ethnic Group
region lies over levels of education more common among Americans than Ethnics. As shown in
Figure 7, the increase in the probability of accepting an American in the first period resulting from
the rightward shift of the right hand limit of the acceptance region, the lightly shaded area, is less
than the decrease resulting from the rightward shift of the left hand limit, the darker shaded area.
Again, with fewer acceptances of Americans in the first period, people are more likely to become
randomly matched with Ethnics in the second period and so the probability of marrying an Ethnic
by the end of the game actually increases.
Although not shown here, it is fairly straightforward to see that the results are reversed when
Ethnics have more education than Americans. All of this information is summarized in Table 7.
4.1.2 Empirical Tests
In order to formally test the implication that the effect of education depends not only on the ethnic
group to which one belongs, but also on the interaction between the size of this group and one’s
level of education, regression analysis is used. The model implies that an increase in education
for immigrants in low education ethnicities with either very high levels of education in small ethnic
groups or low levels of education in large ethnic groups leads to an increase in the probability of
marrying within ethnicity. Conversely, an increase in education for immigrants in high education
ethnicities with either very high levels of education in large ethnic groups or low levels of education
in small ethnic groups leads to a decrease in the probability of marrying within ethnicity. To test
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these implications, I divide the sample according to whether average levels of education are greater
than or less than average American levels and then run probit regressions of the following model
on each of the two samples:
Pr(yijk = 1) = Φ(γ1hijk + γ2h
2
ijk + γ3pjkhijk + γ4pjkh
2
ijk + γ5pjk + γ6Xijk)
A strict interpretation of the theoretical model implies that for both samples γ1 < 0, γ2 > 0,
γ3 > 0 and γ4 < 0. These signs imply a convex relationship between education and endogamy
when the size of the ethnic group is small and a concave relationship when the size is large. In
fact, just as predicted by the theoretical model, certain parameter values are consistent with a
positive relationship between education and endogamy for some specific immigrants in low education
ethnicities. Likewise, certain parameter values obtained from the high education sample can imply
a negative relationship between education and endogamy for certain immigrants. Since the effect
of education on endogamy should generally be negative for people in low education ethnicities
and positive for those in high education ethnicities, the size of the coefficients should differ in the
two samples, but the theoretical model implies the same signs for both high and low education
ethnicities.
Tables 8 and 9 present marginal effects for probit regressions run on low and high education
ethnicities respectively at the county group level. That is, the size of the ethnic group variable
was constructed with the population of the county group as a base. Consistent with the previous
set of regressions, an increase in education leads to a decrease in endogamy rates for low education
ethnicities (Table 8) and an increase for high education ethnicities (Table 9): One more year of
education leads to a 0.04 decrease in the probability of marrying within ethnicity for people in low
education ethnicities and a 0.01 increase in the probability for people in high education ethnicities
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(although this increase is insignificant) when controlling for only age and the square of education
(Column 1).
More noteworthy, however, is what occurs when the education-ethnicity size interactions are
included in specifications (3) and (4). Coefficients of interest all have the expected sign and, except
for the square of education, are all significant at the 5 percent level for low education ethnicities.
Three zones can be constructed using the estimates in Table 8. When the size of the ethnic group
is less than 0.016, education decreases the probability of endogamy at a decreasing rate. When
the size of the ethnic group is between 0.016 and 0.15, education continues to decrease endogamy
but at an increasing rate. In fact, when the size of the ethnic group is greater than 0.15, regression
results imply an initial increase and subsequent decrease in endogamy.
Although the existence of these three zones is consistent with the theory, the model only predicts
an increase in endogamy for people in low education ethnicities when p > 1/2. This is an issue in
the analysis since for no ethnicity-county group combination in the data is the size of ethnic group
greater than a half. This does not mean that the actual probability of meeting someone of the same
ethnicity is always necessarily less than a half. It is reasonable to believe, for example, that the
marriage market is concentrated at the neighborhood level as opposed to the county group level.
Although I do not use data at the neighborhood level I can infer from Borjas’ (1995) measures of
size of ethnicity in the neighborhood that neighborhood concentrations are on average about three
times as high as county group concentrations (See Table 3 for Mexican and Russian examples).
This suggests that immigrants facing a 15 percent probability of encountering a co-ethnic in their
county groups actually face around a 45 percent probability of encountering a co-ethnic in their
neighborhoods. This is certainly very close to the one half that is implied by the theory.
As can be seen in Table 9, three zones can also be constructed for high education ethnicities.
When the size of ethnic group is less than 0.0004, education increases endogamy at a decreasing
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rate. Admittedly, this is inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of the model, but perhaps
sampling error is a greater concern in county groups with virtually no immigrants and children
of immigrants. When the size of the ethnic group is between 0.0004 and 0.048, an increase in
education increases endogamy at an increasing rate. Finally, when the size of the ethnic group is
greater than 0.048, an increase in education results in a decrease in endogamy for very low levels
of education, but for high enough education levels, the effect is positive. This is consistent with
the implications of the model when p > 1/2. Again, it could be that because of ethnic segregation
at the neighborhood level, second-generation immigrants living in county groups with co-ethnic
proportions greater than 0.04 actually face a probability of meeting someone of the same ethnicity
which is greater than a half.
Because these results could be due simply to the high collinearity between the square term of
education and its linear counterpart, spline regressions were run with corresponding specifications.
Results were similar.
4.2 Unequal Variances
Until now, variances of the education distributions have been assumed to be the same in the two
populations, but this is not necessarily the case. Table 10 shows standard deviations of education
for the ethnicities used in this analysis. Notice that half of the ethnicities have standard deviations
which are statistically different from the standard deviation of education in the U.S. population as
a whole.
Through the use of some examples, I will examine the effect of differences in variances on the
implications drawn from the theoretical model. The proof of the cultural adaptability effect does
not change without the equal variance assumption: Regardless of whether variances are the same,
an increase in education always leads to a decrease in endogamy through the cultural adaptability
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Endogamy 1 2 3 4
Schooling -0.042 -0.035 -0.033 -0.018
(-6.59)** (-4.69)** (-3.11)** (-2.02)*
Schooling2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.92)+ (0.83) (0.73) (0.35)
Size of Ethnic Group 4.152 2.938 3.244
(4.88)** (2.94)** (3.80)**
Size of Ethnic Group2 -8.521 -7.07 -7.254
(-4.02)** (-2.86)** (-3.57)**
Schooling*Group Size 0.108 0.118
(3.01)** (3.48)**
Schooling2*Group Size -0.005 -0.006
(-3.61)** (-4.90)**
Mean Group Schooling- -0.046 -0.069
   Mean Schooling (-2.79)** (-7.61)**




Observations 14720 14720 14720 14720
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 8: Probit Marginal Effects of Education and Size of Ethnic Group Interactions for Low
Education Ethnicities
Endogamy 1 2 3 4
Schooling 0.010 0.014 0.055 0.074
(1.04) (1.33) (2.01)* (1.94)+
Schooling2 0.000 0 -0.002 -0.002
0.23) (0.45) (-1.60) (-1.61)
Size of Ethnic Group 2.17 12.568 13.093
(0.42) (1.75)+ (1.88)+
Size of Ethnic Group2 15.566 25.099 13.475
(0.23) (0.34) (0.17)
Schooling*Group Size -1.556 -1.539
(-3.47)** (-2.61)**
Schooling2*Group Size 0.051 0.05
(2.49)* (2.00)*
Mean Group Schooling- 0.084 0.071
   Mean Schooling (1.68)+ (1.24)




Observations 5389 5389 5389 5389
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
















*Statistically different from U.S. 
standard deviation at 5% level. 
U.S. Standard Deviation: 3.05
Table 10: Education Standard Deviations by Ethnicity
effect. The proof of the assortative matching effect, however, is responsive to this assumption.
For simplicity, again assume that T = 0.
4.2.1 Theory
Recall that the probability of endogamy can be written,










The major effect of dropping the equal variance assumption will come from the difference in shape
of the education distributions, Fe and Fa. Although the variances do enter the reservation utility
(the larger the variances, the lower the reservation utility), this is a second order effect. Figure 8
depicts probability density functions for the case where Ethnics have a lower average but a higher
variance in education than Americans. For simplicity, I assume that p = 1/2 so that, as explained
in the previous section, the effect of an increase in education is unambiguous if variances are equal.
It should be clear from Figure 8 that because Ethnics typically have lower levels of education
than Americans, an increase in education of the spouse-searcher typically results in the acceptance
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region lying over education levels more common among Americans. However, as shown by the
acceptance regions in the diagram, when the spouse-searcher has a high enough level of education,
an increase actually leads to an increase in the probability of marrying an Ethnic. The increase
in the probability of marrying an Ethnic resulting from the shift of the right hand limit (darker
shaded region) is greater than the decrease in the probability resulting from the shift of the left
hand limit (lightly shaded region). Because the Ethnic distribution has a larger variance, it is
easier to meet an Ethnic with a very extreme (high) level of education even though Americans
typically have higher education levels.
Figure 9 depicts distributions with the same means as Figure 8 but the variances are reversed.
When Americans have the larger variance, again it is true that in general an increase in education
leads to a decrease in endogamy, but for spouse-searchers with very low levels of education, an
increase can actually lead to an increase in endogamy. Spouse-searchers with extremely low levels
of education are willing to marry those Americans with extremely low levels of education. With
an increase in education, these spouse-searchers become unwilling to marry these Americans and so
they become more likely to marry Ethnics. In terms of the diagram, the increase in the probability
of marrying an American (depicted by the darker shaded region) is smaller than the decrease in
the probability of marrying an American (depicted by the lightly shaded region.)
For ethnicities with average education levels above that of the American average, the basic
relationships remain the same but the probability of in-marriage is typically increasing as opposed
to decreasing. When the Ethnic variance is larger than the American variance, an increase in
education can lead to a decrease in endogamy for men with low levels of education. Similarly,
when the Ethnic variance is smaller than the American variance, an increase in education can lead
to a decrease in endogamy for men with very high levels of education. All of these results are
summarized in Table 11.
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Figure 8: Effect of Education in a Low Education Ethnicity With High Education Variance










h low h high h low h high
σ2e > σ
2
a ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
σ2e = σ
2
a ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
σ2e < σ
2
a ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Table 11: Effect of an Increase in Education by Education Standard Deviation
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4.2.2 Empirical Tests
To test these implications, again I divide the sample according to whether average levels of education
are greater than or less than the average American education and then run probit regressions of
the following model on each of the two samples:
Pr(yijk = 1) = Φ(θ1hijk + θ2h
2
ijk + θ3hijkI(σjk>σak) + θ4h
2
ijkI(σjk>σak) +
θ5I(σjk>σak) + θ6pjk + θ7p
2
jk + θ8Xijk)
where σjk is the standard deviation of education in ethnic group, j, in county group, k, and
I(σjk>σak) is a dichotomous variable equal to one if σjk > σak and zero otherwise. The model
predicts that for both samples θ1 > 0, θ2 < 0, θ3 < 0 and θ4 > 0. This is because for both
high and low education ethnicities, an increase in h leads to an initial decrease in endogamy and
a subsequent increase if σjk > σak, but an initial increase and subsequent decrease if σjk < σak.
Since the effect of education on endogamy should generally be negative for people in low education
ethnicities and positive for those in high education ethnicities, the size of the coefficients should
differ in the two samples, but the theoretical model implies the same signs for both high and low
education ethnicities.
Tables 12 and 13 present marginal effects for probit regressions run on low and high education
ethnicities respectively at the county group level. Again, column (1) shows that an increase in
education leads to a decrease in endogamy rates for low education ethnicities (Table 12) and an
increase for high education ethnicities (Table 13), but the coefficients are not significant. Education-
standard deviation interactions are added in specification (2). For low education ethnicities, the
coefficients of interest all have the expected signs and all but θ1 are statistically significant. For
high education ethnicities, however, no coefficient is statistically different from zero in the second
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column.
One may notice that this empirical specification and the expected signs of the parameters
mirror those of the size of ethnicity implication in the previous section. If education-ethnicity
size interactions are not included in the regression, the coefficients on education-standard deviation
interactions could be biased if standard deviation and ethnicity size are correlated. Thus, in
specification 3, both sets of interactions are included. Note that for low education ethnicities, the
coefficients on the size of the ethnic group interactions and standard deviation interactions remain
significant and maintain the expected sign patterns. For high education ethnicities, the coefficients
remain insignificant. This suggests that variances in education of ethnic groups are not sufficiently
different from the variance in the American distribution to result in the patterns described above.
Inequalities ?? and 2 also hold reconfirming that in general, an increase in education leads to a
decrease in endogamy for people in low education ethnicities, but an increase in endogamy for those
in high education ethnicities.
5 Conclusion
An important channel through which intergenerational assimilation occurs, arguably the most
important, is marriage to a native. This paper examines the effect of human capital on the
intermarriage decisions of second-generation immigrants.
Three avenues through which education affects the likelihood of intermarriage are presented
in this paper. The cultural adaptability effect suggests that educated people are better able
to adapt to different customs and cultures. Since immigrants with more human capital have a
better “technology” for adapting to the host society, they are more likely to marry natives. The
enclave effect suggests that educated immigrants are more likely to move out of their ethnic enclaves
because, for example, they have larger geographic labor markets. They are, therefore, less likely to
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Endogamy 1 2 3
Schooling -0.010 0.018 0.012
(-1.06) (1.53) (1.00)
Schooling2 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.62) (-3.35)** (-2.99)**
Size of Ethnic Group 3.748 3.702 3.412
(4.50)** (4.54)** (4.05)**
Size of Ethnic Group2 -7.518 -7.345 -7.233
(-3.69)** (-3.60)** (-3.56)**
Mean Group Schooling- -0.0685 -0.071 -0.071
   Mean Schooling (-7.57)** (-10.25)** (-10.17)**
Age 0.011 0.011 0.011
(10.39)** (10.55)** (10.59)**












Observations 14720 14720 14720
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 12: Probit Marginal Effects of Education Level and Variance Interactions on Endogamy for
Low Education Ethnicities
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Endogamy 1 2 3
Schooling 0.020 0.024 0.082
(1.15) (0.95) (2.14)*
Schooling2 -.000 -0.001 -0.003
(-0.88) (-1.06) (-2.13)*
Size of Ethnic Group 0.977 1.734 14.624
(0.16) (0.3) (2.40)*
Size of Ethnic Group2 30.113 19.042 0.793
(0.37) (0.25) (0.01)
Mean Group Schooling- 0.068 0.064 0.067
   Mean Schooling (1.21) (1.16) (1.18)
Age 0.007 0.007 0.007
(1.74) (1.68) (1.67)












Observations 5389 5389 5389
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 13: Probit Marginal Effects of Education Level and Variance Interactions on Endogamy for
High Education Ethnicities
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meet possible spouses of their own ethnicity and so, naturally, less likely to marry them. Lastly, the
assortative matching effect posits that marriage surplus increases when education levels of husband
and wife are similar. This implies that given a costly search process, educated immigrants may
be willing to substitute similarities in ethnicity for similarities in education. I develop a model of
assortative matching which predicts that an increase in education for immigrants in highly educated
ethnicities should actually decrease the likelihood of intermarriage while the opposite is true for
men in low education ethnicities.
Using U.S. Census data on second-generation immigrants, I find that indeed the effect of educa-
tion on endogamy differs by ethnicity suggesting that assortative matching is more important than
cultural adaptability when controlling for the enclave effect. In fact, although there is some evidence
of the enclave effect, after accounting for the assortative matching effect, the cultural adaptability
theory has no support from the data. Second-generation immigrants do exhibit marked preferences
for marrying within their ethnicity, but contrary to the predictions of the cultural adaptability
effect, these preferences are not related to education, at least not after accounting for migration
patterns.
The results from this analysis can be interpreted beyond the realm of marriage decisions; in-
terethnic marriages are a measure of the broader interaction between immigrants, of any generation,
and natives. Presumably, human capital affects intermarriages in the same ways it affects any as-
sociation between people of different ethnicities. Given the abundant literature on the importance
of networks in determining wages, employment rates, occupational status, and schooling levels,
the social integration of immigrants to the host society plays an important role in their economic
integration.
If the social integration of immigrants is in fact a policy goal, the conclusions from this paper
can provide some insights into both immigration and education policy. Given the correlation in ed-
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ucation levels between parents and their offspring, the fact that education affects second-generation
endogamy mainly through assortative matching has implications towards which immigrant groups
can most quickly assimilate into U.S. society. Specifically, it implies that those ethnic groups with
average education levels closest to the U.S. level can more easily integrate into U.S. society. In fact,
given the evidence that all else equal, immigrants prefer to marry within their ethnicity, it may
be even more beneficial to give priority to the people with education levels most similar to U.S.
average levels but that are in the least educated ethnic groups. Because of the greater scarcity of
potential spouses of both the same ethnicity and education level, these immigrants would be most
likely to associate with natives.20
The role of human capital in intermarriage decisions also provides an indirect avenue through
which education policies could catalyze the social integration process of immigrants and their
children. The fact that education works mainly through assortative matching suggests that it is the
immigrants at the bottom of the education distribution that have the most to gain from education
policies. For example, because education only has a positive effect on interethnic marriage rates
for low education ethnicities, policies aimed at increasing high school graduation rates would be
more beneficial than policies providing scholarships for graduate schools. In the end, many insights
into the assimilation process can be gained from studying the marriage decisions of immigrants and
their descendents.
20Of course, if this policy were implemented, then in the long run, the low education ethnic group could no longer
be considered a low education group at least in the U.S.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: An increase in the man’s education results in a shift to the right of the accepted











Proof: To prove that 1 − dR/dH
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−R are both positive, we need only show that
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Expanding −R, we arrive at
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−R is always positive, the sign of dR/dH
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B Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: Assuming fe and fa are the same unimodal distribution with different means









e ) such that if
either p > 1/2 and h > h∗, p < 1/2 and h < h∗, or if p = 1/2, an increase in h will yield a
decrease in the probability of marrying within ethnicity.
dPr(Endogamy)
dh









a , the opposite is true. That is, if either p < 1/2 and h > h
∗, p > 1/2 and h < h∗,




























By Proposition 2, we know that dLu/dh and dLl/dh are both positive meaning that the limits
of the acceptance region always shift to the right with an increase in education. Thus, a sufficient
condition21 for the signability of equation 9A relies on the signability of fe(Lu) − fa(Lu) and
fe(L
l) − fa(Ll). If fe and fa are the same unimodal distribution with different means, then we
need only show that the acceptance limits, Ll and Lu, lie on opposite sides of the intersection of the
two distributions. To see why, look at Figure 3. If the limits lie on opposite sides of the intersection
of fe and fa, the upper limit will always be to the right of the intersection and the lower limit to




a , then fe(L
u) − fa(Lu) < 0 and −fe(Ll) + fa(Ll) < 0 and




a , then fe(U) − fa(U) > 0 and




a , then fe(L
u)−fa(Lu) = 0
and −fe(Ll) + fa(Ll)=0 and thus Pr(Endogamy)/dh = 0.
The remainder of the proof proceeds in two parts. In Part 1, it is shown that if p = 1/2,








a When p 6=
1/2, a sufficient condition on h is found which guarantees these relationships between h and the
Pr(Endogamy).
PART 1 : Because the utility function is strictly concave, to do this, we need only show that





2 ) is greater than the
reservation utility, R. Because of the shape of the utility function, this condition is enough to
guarantee that the maximum accepted education level lies to the right of the intersection and the
minimum always lies to the left. Evaluating utility from the level of education at the intersection
21The necessary and sufficient condition depends on the functional forms of fe and fa and thus it is not provided in
this paper. Moreover, attempts to solve for this condition proved computationally difficult with even a basic normal
distribution.
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Recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that the reservation utility equation can be written,
R = −p(σ2e + h
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Since this proves that Ll and Lu lie on opposite sides of the intersection of the education distribu-
tions equation 9A is signable in the way discussed above.
PART 2: To solve for that level of education which guarantees that acceptance limits lie on
opposite sides of the intersection of the education distributions, we simply set Lu=µ and solve for
h. This h we call h∗. Because of the symmetry of Lu and Ll, this yields the same h∗ as setting
Ll=µ. Thus, one can see that
h∗ =
1
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a and p > 1/2, then by construction of h
∗, Lu = µ and so h∗ < µ and Ll < µ.






l). Since Lu = µ, fe(Lu) = fa(Lu) and so the second
component of equation (9A) drops out. If h > h∗, Lu > µ. and so fe(Lu) < fa(Lu). Thus, by
the discussion above, all of the components of equation (9A) are signable if h ≥ h∗. Specifically,









a and p < 1/2, then by construction of h
∗, Ll = µ and so h∗ > µ and Lu > µ. Since






u). Since Ll = µ, fe(Ll) = fa(Ll), and so the first component
of equation (9A) drops out. If h < h∗, Ll < µ and so fe(Lu) < fa(Lu). Thus, all of the components




a , then for any h ≤ h∗,
dPr(Endogamy)/dh < 0.
The proofs work exactly the same way when h
w
e > h
w
a .
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